The stabilization effects of Taylor rules are analyzed in a limited participation framework with and without credit market imperfections in capital goods production. Financial frictions substantially amplify the impact of shocks, and also reinforce the stabilizing or destabilizing effects of interest rate rules. However, these effects are reversed relative to New Keynesian models: under limited participation, interest rate rules are stabilizing for productivity shocks, but imply an output-inflation tradeoff for demand shocks. Moreover, because financial frictions imply excessive fluctuation, stabilization via an interest rate rule can be a welfare-improving response to productivity shocks. 
Introduction
How do interest rate rules perform under credit market imperfections? Are their stabilization properties the same as in the frictionless case?
Recent evidence shows that central banks in most industrialized countries use the nominal interest rate as their monetary policy instrument, following rules intended to reduce the volatility of in ‡ation and/or output (Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998) ). The impact of these "Taylor rules"has mainly been modeled under the assumption of perfect credit markets. However, credit markets are far from perfect. Since a credit contract involves the unknown future, one side of the contract (usually borrowers) typically has more information about its own performance than the other (lenders). Borrowers'information may be re ‡ected in a high contracted interest rate, and di¤erences in private information could also explain the di¤erences in …nancing between small and large …rms (Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), and ). Figure 1 reports the evolution of the spread between the bank prime rate and the three-month commercial paper rate for the period 1971:1-1997:2, together with real GNP growth for the same period in the US. During this time, the average spread is positive (191 basis points), implying a premium paid by riskier borrowers. Also, the chart clearly shows the countercyclicality of this spread, which has a correlation with GNP growth of 0:35 in the sample. We could interpret this as evidence that …nancial imperfections diminish in good times and increase in booms. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) argue that such time-varying imperfections may help amplify the movements in output. If this is the case, then studying the performance of stabilization policy while abstracting from credit frictions might be misleading, and an adequate model for this purpose should re ‡ect the dynamics of the risk premium.
In this paper I investigate the performance of monetary policy governed by interest rate rules in ‡exible-price economies with and without credit market imperfections. Money will have real e¤ects in the model, because I assume limited participation of households in …nancial markets.
Credit market frictions are introduced through asymmetric information in the production of capital. In this context, I study the e¤ects of shocks to productivity and to government spending, comparing the implications of two types of policy rules: an exogenous constant money growth rule, and several versions of the Taylor rule.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, by including interest rate rules and credit market imperfections in a limited participation setup I obtain a framework which is well-suited to address the interaction of frictions and monetary policy instruments, but which yields very di¤erent implications from new Keynesian models. Second, the model's capability to account for some stylized facts in business cycles dynamics is quantitatively analyzed. And third, comparing Taylor-type rules to the case of constant money growth, this framework is used to analyze the stabilization properties of monetary policy.
The main results can be summarized as follows. Introducing credit market imperfections enables the model to replicate the negative correlation between output and the risk premium, and signi…cantly increases the ampli…cation of shocks. I also …nd that in a limited participation setup, interest rate rules have the opposite stabilization e¤ects when compared with a sticky price setting. Furthermore, a Taylor rule has stronger e¤ects, either stabilizing or destabilizing, when there are credit market imperfections. Finally, while stabilizing the economy's response to productivity shocks is counterproductive if …nancial markets are frictionless, when there are credit market imperfections I …nd that using a stabilizing interest rate rule can bring the economy closer to its frictionless optimum.
The following section brie ‡y discusses related literature. Thereafter, Section 2 develops the model, Section 3 de…nes the equilibrium, and Section 4 speci…es parameters. Section 5 studies the model's second moments and impulse responses. The interaction of credit market imperfections and interest rate rules is analyzed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. Fuerst (1995) investigates whether the presence of …nancial frictions alters the e¤ects of productivity and monetary shocks. His model economy is also a limited participation setup in which credit market imperfections arise in the production of capital goods, but his analysis di¤ers from mine in some key points. He restricts monetary policy to a constant money growth rule. Also, he does not …nd signi…cant ampli…cation or propagation from …nancial frictions, and his model fails to replicate the observed negative correlation between output and the risk premium.
Related literature
In a comment on Fuerst's paper, Gertler (1995) highlights the crucial role of the elasticity of net worth with respect to output in this type of analysis. Since pro…ts and cash ‡ow and hence entrepreneurs'net worth show a high positive elasticity with respect to output growth, the need for external …nancing and the cost of external funds fall substantially during booms. This helps replicate the negative correlation between output and the risk premium observed in the data, and implies a positive feedback on output that can be quantitatively important if net worth is su¢ ciently elastic. I internalize this fact in my analysis and obtain signi…cant ampli…cation and persistence from credit market imperfections.
Much of the rest of the literature assumes a new Keynesian structure, like Bernanke et al. (2000) , who study credit imperfections a¤ecting capital demand in a sticky-price model.
These new Keynesian models contrast sharply with mine, because they predict that the use of interest rate rules stabilizes the economy's response to aggregate demand shocks. This follows from the assumption of nominal rigidities and demand-determined output, which imply that distortions arising from the demand side can be neutralized by changing the money supply (that is, by using the interest rate as an instrument). In contrast, given the limited participation setup assumed here, output becomes supply-determined and aggregate demand is left the role of determining the price level. This implies that shocks a¤ecting aggregate supply can be stabilized by manipulating the interest rate, whereas a tradeo¤ between output and in ‡ation stabilization arises when demand shocks are considered.
The model
The model is a cash-in-advance economy with two additional frictions. The …rst one allows for the nonneutral e¤ects of money by assuming limited participation of households in …nancial markets. The second one introduces credit market imperfections in the production of capital.
The economy is composed of households, …rms, …nancial intermediaries, a monetary authority, a …scal authority and entrepreneurs.
The households, …rms, and …nancial intermediaries in the economy are assumed to belong to a family. This family splits early in the morning to play separate roles. At the end of the day, they all gather and share all their earnings.
Households
There is a continuum of in…nite-lived households in the interval [0, 1] . The representative household chooses contingency plans for consumption (C t ), labor supply (L t ); and deposits 1 (
taking as given the sequence of prices and quantities f
subject to
Here E 0 denotes expectations conditional on time 0 information, 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, the constant denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of consumption, is the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply with respect to real wages, and is a scale parameter. The optimal labor-leisure and deposits decisions are
where U C and U L denote the marginal utility of consumption and disutility of labor, respectively.
Equation (5) is equivalent to the Fisher equation in other monetary models, except that expectations depend on the information set at t 1; re ‡ecting households'limited participation in …nancial markets. That is, households make their portfolio choices before time t shocks are revealed, and cannot adjust their deposits again until the next period. This rigidity induces the liquidity e¤ ect of a money supply shock on the nominal interest rate observed in the data, because …rms are the only agents able to absorb the excess liquidity in the economy after a monetary injection. The central bank achieves money market clearing by reducing the interest rate so that …rms are willing to borrow the excess amount of funds (see Lucas, 1990; Christiano, 1991; Fuerst, 1992; and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1997) .
Firms
Firms produce a homogeneous good in a competitive framework. They hire labor from households, and purchase capital, as inputs for production. Firms own no initial funds, so they must borrow at the beginning of every period to pay the wage bill and current capital purchases. The production function takes the form
where H t denotes the demand for household's labor, and K t is capital needed for production. I assume that k + h = 1, re ‡ecting constant returns to scale in technology. The variable A t is the technological shock, modeled by a …rst order Markov process
with 0 < a < 1; and " a;t+1 is an i.i.d. normal shock with zero mean and standard deviation " a :
The borrowing decision of …rms is subject to the following cash-in-advance constraint: 
where is the depreciation rate of capital, and the subscript t + 1 denotes the time when capital will be used. The dividends …rms distribute to their owners (households) are given by
Firms maximize their shareholders' utility. Since pro…ts are distributed at the end of the period, a …rm values one more dollar in dividends at time t; by how much consumption marginal utility households obtain at time t + 1; by refusing this time t dollar. Thus …rms maximize
where t+1 denotes the relative marginal utility the household obtains from an additional unit of consumption at time t + 1,
Maximizing (10) subject to equation (8), the optimal input demands made by …rms are obtained. The representative …rm demands labor and capital, respectively, according to
Note that all decisions made by …rms, unlike households' deposit choice, are based on the complete information set at t. Labor demand (12) is a¤ected by the interest rate since it is paid in advance. Capital demand (13) depends on expected in ‡ation, on the price of capital, Q t ; and on the nominal interest rate, everything discounted by the marginal disutility of labor (11). The left-hand side of equation (13) is the loss in utility a household bears at time t + 1 if dividends are reduced by one unit at time t to buy more capital. This is equated to the value of the extra dividend at time t + 1; which can be spent at time t + 2:
The …nancial intermediary
Banks principal plus interest due on households'deposits, R t _ D t : Implicitly, the fact that the interest rate paid to depositors is the same as that paid by borrowers means that banks act in a competitive market for state-contingent loans (that is, R t is contingent on time t information). Pro…ts of the …nancial intermediary are thus
These pro…ts are distributed to households at the end of the period, as seen in (3).
Entrepreneurs
Capital is produced by entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are risk-neutral, live only one period, and can each carry out one project that requires one unit of consumption goods. The entrepreneur operates a technology that transforms this unit of consumption goods into ! t units of capital goods. The variable ! t is an idiosyncratic shock uniformly distributed in the non-negative interval [1 !; 1 + !] ; with density ( ! t ) and distribution function ( ! t ).
Every period, after production takes place, part of the output Y t is transferred lump-sum to entrepreneurs; this constitutes their net worth N W t . According to the data, N W t is positively related with output, and more volatile than output; the elasticity of net worth with respect to output will be called . 2 Net worth will also be a¤ected by a shock Z t which captures other factors (e.g. changes in taxes or in market power) a¤ecting …rms' cash positions, so I assume
To generate …nancial frictions, it is assumed that this net worth is insu¢ cient for the entrepreneur's project. Moreover, since entrepreneurs live for only one period they cannot accumulate wealth. 3 Therefore, they need to borrow the di¤erence between their required investment and their endowment, 1 N W t : Firms are assumed to lend to entrepreneurs in a competitive market, and to be able to deal with a su¢ cient number of entrepreneurs in order to pool their idiosyncratic risk. In other words, …rms can set up a "mutual fund" to lend to entrepreneurs.
The relationship between entrepreneurs and the mutual fund is a¤ected by asymmetric information. When they sign their contract, neither the lender nor entrepreneurs can observe the idiosyncratic shock. Afterwards, ! t is revealed to the entrepreneurs, but the lender cannot observe this outcome unless he monitors. Monitoring costs are a …xed proportion c > 0 of the capital produced. Thus capital production involves a costly state veri…cation problem, which is optimally solved by a standard debt contract, according to Townsend (1979) , and Gale and Hellwig (1985) . In this debt contract, an entrepreneur who borrows (1 N W t ) consumption goods agrees to repay R k t (1 N W t ) units of capital, if the realization of ! t is good. If the realization of ! t is bad, then the entrepreneur prefers to default. Thus the default decision is determined by a threshold value
In the optimal contract, the lender monitors in case of default, and con…scates all the entrepreneur's production, but nothing more. That is, entrepreneurs have limited liability.
To ensure that this debt contract is e¢ cient and incentive compatible, the participation of lenders must be guaranteed. The mutual fund will …nd it pro…table to lend the entrepreneurs as long as the expected return net of monitoring costs (at least) equals the amount lent:
Here the left hand side denotes the amount borrowed by entrepreneurs, and the right hand side re ‡ects the expected return on this loan, net of monitoring costs. 4
3 The transfer they receive is taxed away when entrepreneurs die, i.e. at the end of the period, and then returned lump sum to consumers. 4 Credit rationing issues are avoided in this setup since expected returns going to the mutual fund are increasing in the threshold value _ !t: For more details on this see Bernanke et al. (2000) .
Also, participation of the entrepreneur in the contract must be assured. This means that his expected payo¤ must (at least) equal the net worth he invests in the project:
where the left hand side denotes the entrepreneur's expected payo¤. This expected value includes expected production of capital, minus what must be paid back on the loan, both conditional on not defaulting.
This costly state veri…cation problem is solved taking as given the sequence of variables
From equations (16) and (17) above, it follows that
Additionally, note that
that is, if monitoring costs are positive, c > 0; part of the output is destroyed by these costs,
, while the rest is divided between the entrepreneur, f ( _ ! t ), and the lender, g(
The number of projects undertaken, i t ; net of monitoring costs, constitutes the supply of capital:
The …scal authority
There is a government in this economy which consumes an amount G t : This government spending is …nanced by lump sum taxes levied from households, T t : In this economy government spending is random and ‡uctuates according to
with 0 < g < 1; and " g;t+1 is an i.i.d. normal shock with zero mean and standard deviation " g :
It is assumed that the …scal authority maintains a balanced budget every period, that is,
2.6 The monetary authority I study the stabilization properties of monetary policy under alternative monetary regimes.
First, I take a constant money growth rule as the benchmark. In this case, money supply is perfectly inelastic, and it is the nominal interest rate that must adjust after any shock. Money growth t evolves as follows:
with 0 < < 1; and " t is an i.i.d. normal shock with zero mean and standard deviation " :
Then, I consider the e¤ects of using a Taylor rule, according to which the central bank sets the nominal interest rate as a function of its lagged value, deviations of GDP from its trend and of in ‡ation from its target level. In this case, the central bank tunes the money supply to achieve the desired nominal interest rate. Below, I compare the dynamics of the model under the following interest rate rules:
Lagged interest rate rule
Current interest rate rule
Forward-looking interest rate rule
where R t denotes the gross nominal interest rate; and Y is the nonstochastic steady state output.
The exponents r ; ; y > 0 re ‡ect the concern of the central bank on interest rate smoothness, in ‡ation and output stabilization, respectively.
Equilibrium
To analyze the general equilibrium, I detrend all nominal variables by dividing by beginning-ofperiod monetary holdings, _ M t . I de…ne equilibrium in recursive form, omitting time subscripts and using primes to denote the next period's variables.
The timing can be summarized as follows:
Household's deposit choice Under certain restrictions, including su¢ ciently tightly bounded shock processes, there will exist an equilibrium in which both cash-in-advance constraints (2) and (8) will bind for each state of the world. In such equilibria, the nominal interest rate will be positive, and there will be a positive level of deposits. In the analysis below, I will focus on this type of equilibrium.
Parameter values
The parameters of the model are ; ; ; ; ; k , h , !; c ; ; as well as the parameters of the stochastic processes for the shocks ( a ; ; z ; g ; " a ; " ; " z ; and " g ): I take some of these parameters from previous business cycle literature and calibrate others to match some moments of US data.
Given an average quarterly money growth rate of _ X = 1:6%; the discount factor is 0:9926:
This implies an average annual real interest rate equal to 3% at the non-stochastic steady state, consistent with US data. The relative risk aversion parameter is set equal to = 1. The parameter takes the value 3; that is, the elasticity of labor supply with respect to real wages is 1=3. This value lies within the range usually employed in macroeconomic studies. The coe¢ cient is normalized so that labor in the non-stochastic steady state equals one.
The depreciation rate, ; is taken to be 2:4% per quarter. The capital share on aggregate with respect to output of = 3:84. I calibrate R k to match a risk premium of 191 basis points measured by the spread between the bank prime rate and the three-month commercial paper rate on average terms. The bound ! on the support of the uniform distribution of! t is chosen to match an annual bankruptcy rate, ( _ ! t ); of 10% for US data from 1980-2001. 5 The proportion of internal project …nancing, N W; is set equal to 0.15 as in Gertler (1995) . The value of monitoring costs, c ; is set equal 20% as in Fuerst (1995) . This calibration implies a threshold value ! of 0:8619.
Both productivity shocks and government spending are found in the data to be highly persistent (King and Rebelo, 2000; Ireland, 2001; McGrattan, 1994) . I estimate productivity, money and government spending processes for the US during the period 1970:1-2000:4. I obtain a = 0:9875; " a = 0:007 for the productivity shock process, and g = 0:8074 and " g = 0:0092 for the …scal shock process. For money supply shocks the estimated correlation is 0:57 with standard deviation " = 0:0041. Finally, shocks to net worth are considered to be nonautocorrelated, that is, z is 0: The standard deviation of the shock to net worth is calibrated to match the negative correlation between output and the risk premium (y; rp); I obtain " z = 0:0011:
In Section 6 below I analyze the stabilization properties of interest rate rules, compared to those of a constant money growth rule. I take as my benchmark a current version of the Taylor rule with coe¢ cients that make equilibrium unique (in other words, I use a stable rule in the terms of Christiano and Gust, 1999) . This is the rule called BP (baseline parameterization) in the table below. To check for robustness I also consider four alternative speci…cations of the rules previously studied in the literature, summarized in the following table:
RulenCoef f icients CGG1 and CGG2 refer to the coe¢ cients employed by Christiano and Gust (1999) , which when applied to a forward-looking interest rate rule (like in Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 2000) yield uniqueness and indeterminacy of equilibria, respectively. TR denotes the stable general
Taylor rule coe¢ cients estimated by Taylor (1993) . Finally, RW refers to the coe¢ cients that when applied to a lagged Taylor rule (à-la-Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997) lead to indeterminacy/explosiveness of equilibria.
Below, I will denote the model without frictions the symmetric information model, c = 0, and the case with frictions the asymmetric information model, c > 0 (SI and AI, respectively).
Notice that when monitoring costs are zero, the model collapses to a standard limited participation framework.
E¤ects of credit market imperfections
In this section, I study the behavior of the model with credit market imperfections, and compare it to the standard frictionless model. First, I establish that both models (SI and AI) are capable of addressing some of the standard stylized facts considered in the business cycle literature.
Next, I analyze the reactions of the two economies to productivity and demand shocks. Bank Prime rate and the Three-month commercial paper rate. When simulating the model, the shock processes have been estimated directly from US data, as explained in the previous section.
Second moments
It is observed that consumption is roughly as volatile as output in the two models, and investment is much more volatile than output in both settings, while the relative standard deviation of labor with respect to output is somewhat higher than what is observed in the model. Notice that in ‡ation ‡uctuates more in the model that in the data, basically due to the ‡exible price setting. Both models report correlations among output, labor and investment moderately lower than those in the data. The AI model is, by construction, able to account for the negative correlation between the growth rate of output and the risk premium.
In summary, the parameterized speci…cations analyzed in this paper display reasonable second moment properties which are quite similar to each other, except that the AI version helps understand the movements in the risk premium, a fact missing in the SI case. Figure 2 reports the impulse response functions of the models with (dashed line) and without (solid line) credit market imperfections to a 1% productivity shock at time one, " a;1 = 0:01;
Impulse response functions

Credit market imperfections and shocks to productivity
assuming that monetary policy follows a constant money growth rule.
In the benchmark case (SI), a positive productivity shock makes inputs more productive.
Output and investment increase and prices fall, enhancing demand for cash inputs. Since monitoring costs are zero in this framework, capital goods are elastically supplied at the price Q t = 1:
With credit market imperfections, the initial response of output and investment to the same shock is not only ampli…ed but also more persistent than in the frictionless case. The ampli…-cation of investment is especially strong; it rises about 30% more than in the benchmark case.
Higher productivity increases entrepreneurs' net worth through the increase in output. Since entrepreneurs become richer, they need to borrow less, which lightens the monitoring cost problem, re ‡ected in the fall of the risk premium and of the price of capital, 6 an e¤ect absent in the SI setting. This positive feedback in output and investment makes output increase more and prices fall more than in the SI model. Meanwhile, consumption goods are substituted by investment goods as they become relatively less expensive. This explains the weaker initial reaction of consumption in the AI model, though consumption eventually rises more than in the SI case as capital grows.
Credit market imperfections and shocks to demand
Figure 3 displays the response of the economy with and without …nancial imperfections to a 1% government spending shock at time one, " g;1 = 0:01; when the monetary authority follows a constant money growth rule.
In the standard limited participation model (SI), the rise in government spending induces a rise in output, labor and in prices, while consumption and investment fall. Higher expected taxes imply a negative wealth e¤ect that diminishes consumption and motivates greater labor supply.
Regarding the fall in investment, there is no clear theoretical consensus on the e¤ects of changes in government spending: the overall reaction of investment depends both on the persistence of the shock and the elasticity of labor supply. 7 In this model, persistence of g = 0:95 is not high enough to make investment rise.
In the AI model, …nancial frictions induce a larger increase in output through the rise in entrepreneurs'net worth. This e¤ect, together with the fall in the price of capital, alleviates the fall in investment, while aggravating the reduction of consumption. But notice that in contrast to the case of productivity shocks, output and prices now go in the same direction. Thus, positive feedback in output in the AI model reduces the increase in prices after a government spending shock, whereas the decrease in prices was reinforced in response to a productivity shock. This di¤erence in transmission of shocks to output and prices helps explain the stabilization e¤ects of monetary policy analyzed in the next section.
Stabilization properties of Taylor rules
Once the e¤ects of …nancial frictions have been analyzed, the next step is to study the stabilization properties of interest rate rules with and without credit market imperfections. Table   2 shows the unconditional second moments of output, in ‡ation and interest rates generated by the model under the BP (current, lagged and forward), the forward-looking version of CGG1
and current version of TR rules, and compares the outcomes with the constant money growth rule (CMG). The only rules considered here are those which yield a unique equilibrium.
In all the cases studied, the use of an interest rate rule yields lower volatility of output than the CMG rule, but at the expense of higher interest rate volatility. In ‡ation volatility is also reduced in most of the current and lagged versions of the Taylor rule, but increases when a forward-looking rule is employed. This result is interesting since it is precisely the forwardlooking rule that Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) …nd best represents the post-Volcker period, a time characterized by a reduction in the volatility of the economy, in particular output and in ‡ation. The calculations in this paper show that changing assumptions about price setting may undo the price stabilization achieved by the forward-looking rule, and thus might alter the conclusions of Clarida et al. (2000) .
While interest rate rules decrease output volatility, the …nancial accelerator is still at work:
for all the rules, volatilities are greater with …nancial frictions than without. Finally, the second main result, emphasized in Table 3 , is that the stabilization achieved by the interest rate rule is stronger if there are …nancial frictions in the economy. That is, the decrease in output volatility caused by moving from a constant money growth rule to an interest rate rule is always stronger under …nancial frictions. While the di¤erence is not be quantitatively large, it provides an interesting theoretical contrast with new Keynesian models, as emphasized further below.
These results come from a simulation with all the shocks at work. To better understand the results, I next focus on two types of shocks that re ‡ect the current conventional wisdom on the stabilization e¤ects of interest rate rules. According to new Keynesian models, Taylor rules are able to stabilize the economy in the event of shocks to demand, but imply a tradeo¤ between output and in ‡ation stabilization in response to productivity shocks. In contrast, I
show below that this result is reversed in limited participation models. More concretely, in a limited participation model Taylor rules are able to stabilize an economy that receives shocks to productivity, but imply a tradeo¤ if shocks are to demand. Table 4 reports the standard deviations for output, in ‡ation and interest rates generated by the model under the stable rules. Two results stand out. First, all the rules stabilize both output and in ‡ation after productivity shocks. This goes against the widely established result that changes in the interest rate can stabilize demand originated shocks but imply a tradeo¤ between output and in ‡ation stabilization when shocks are to productivity. As Poole (1970) stated, in a framework in which prices are rigid, and therefore output is demand determined, any change in demand can be o¤set by controlling the interest rate, and the economy can be completely stabilized. On the contrary, in a limited participation setup like the one analyzed here, prices are ‡exible and output is supply determined. In this case, the monetary authority can stabilize both output and in ‡ation by setting the interest rate if shocks are to productivity.
Productivity shocks only
As mentioned above, the second main …nding is that output stabilization is even stronger when there are …nancial frictions in the economy. This result is robust to the parameters and timing of the interest rate rule. On the other hand, the presence of credit market imperfections is irrelevant for the degree of in ‡ation stabilization. The highest output-stabilization occurs under a lagged CGG rule, whereas for prices it is the forward-looking stable CGG rule.
The reason an interest rate rule stabilizes output and in ‡ation is that the monetary authority reacts both to the rise in output and to the fall in prices by increasing the interest rate. Both productive inputs are cash goods, so higher interest rates act like a tax on input demands, raising marginal costs and partially o¤setting the expansion induced by the shock. This cost e¤ect is strengthened in the model with imperfections. There, stabilizing output by raising interest rates is translated into a lower growth of entrepreneurial net worth, further braking output growth, so the stabilizing e¤ect of the Taylor rule is reinforced. Thus, under ‡exible prices, and in contrast with a sticky price setup, an interest rate rule reduces both in ‡ation and output variability after productivity disturbances. This result is novel in this type of analysis. Table 5 reports the same statistics as Table 4 for the case of …scal shocks.
Demand shocks only
Under the interest rate rule, the initial rise in output after a positive demand shock is strongly damped by the reaction of the interest rate to rising in ‡ation. Thereafter, output rises, but less than under a constant money growth rule. Thus, as before, in ‡ation is stabilized by the rule and this stabilization is stronger in the AI model. However, output is now destabilized in both SI and AI models. In other words, in response to demand shocks the use of interest rate rules involves a tradeo¤ between output and in ‡ation stabilization.
This con…rms the observation that a Taylor rule has the opposite stabilizing e¤ects in a ‡exible price setting compared to a sticky price model. In a limited participation model, using an interest rate rule in response to demand shocks stabilizes in ‡ation but at the cost of destabilizing output, whereas such rules stabilize the economy overall in the sticky price setup. Furthermore, in line with the results above, both the destabilizing and stabilizing e¤ects are stronger under …nancial frictions.
Some welfare implications
While this paper focuses primarily on a positive analysis of the stabilization properties of interest rate rules, it is also important to ask whether stabilization is desirable. Although computing the optimal rule is beyond the scope of this paper, this impulse response analysis allows for some simple but interesting conclusions about welfare.
As a welfare benchmark, the two models in this paper can be compared with a standard real business cycle model. The RBC model calculated here uses the same technology and preferences as the limited participation model, but eliminates all frictions, including the cash-in-advance constraint. Thus we can measure deviations from optimality on the real side by comparing the responses to a 1% productivity and government spending shocks in this RBC model to those in the SI and AI models under two policy regimes: the CMG and the current BP rules. Figure 4 plots the results for output. I …nd that a constant money growth rule keeps the SI model close to the "frictionless" case, which implies that a "stabilizing" interest rate rule stabilizes too much, driving output further away from the frictionless economy's path. However, with …nancial frictions the same interest rate rule brings output close to that of the RBC model, reducing the excessive ‡uctuation caused by the credit market imperfections. Similar calculations for consumption and labor supply con…rm that there is a welfare improvement on the real side from following an interest rate rule in the AI case but not in the SI case.
This shows that there may be room for interest rate rules to smooth the excessive ‡uctuation caused by failures in credit markets. While the RBC comparison only reveals losses on the real side of the model, I have shown that a Taylor rule which stabilizes output after a productivity shock also stabilizes in ‡ation. Thus, in this framework, there should be no presumption that productivity-based ‡uctuations are bene…cial. On the other hand, whether it would be good to use a Taylor rule in an economy dominated by demand shocks is unclear, given the tradeo¤ between output and in ‡ation stabilization.
Conclusions and further research
This paper has analyzed the performance of interest rate rules in the presence of credit market imperfections. In this limited participation economy, several versions of the Taylor rule similar to the one employed by Christiano and Gust (1999) stabilize both output and in ‡ation after productivity shocks, whereas an output-in ‡ation tradeo¤ arises for demand shocks. Both the stabilizing and destabilizing e¤ects of the rule are ampli…ed by the presence of …nancial frictions.
These results provide a contrast with the implications of new Keynesian models.
Contrary to the common intuition that productivity-driven ‡uctuations are optimal, I …nd that under credit market imperfections the stabilization of productivity shocks by means of a Taylor rule can improve welfare. However, whether or not a Taylor rule is bene…cial overall will depend on whether supply or demand shocks are the dominant source of ‡uctuations in the economy.
This analysis could be extended to derive the optimal monetary policy rule in a scenario of …nancial frictions. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) ; where z denotes the standard deviation of log z: In the …gure, the solid line denotes the real GNP growth, whereas the dashed line refers to the spread between the Bank Prime rate and the Three-month commercial paper rate. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
